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How Constitutional Norms Break Down
Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen

ABSTRACT
From the moment Donald Trump was elected president, critics have anguished over a breakdown
in constitutional norms. History demonstrates, however, that constitutional norms are perpetually
in flux. The principal source of instability is not that these unwritten rules can be destroyed by
politicians who deny their legitimacy, their validity, or their value. Rather, the principal source of
instability is that constitutional norms can be decomposed—dynamically interpreted and applied
in ways that are held out as compliant but end up limiting their capacity to constrain the conduct
of government officials.
This Article calls attention to that latent instability and, in so doing, begins to taxonomize and
theorize the structure of constitutional norm change. We explore some of the different modes in
which unwritten norms break down in our constitutional system and the different dangers and
opportunities associated with each. Moreover, we argue that under certain plausible conditions,
it will be more worrisome when norms are subtly revised than when they are openly flouted. This
somewhat paradoxical argument suggests that many commentators have been misjudging our
current moment: President Trump’s flagrant defiance of norms may not be as big a threat to our
constitutional democracy as the more complex deterioration of norms underway in other institutions.
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1

INTRODUCTION
From the moment Donald Trump was elected president, critics have
anguished over a breakdown in constitutional norms. Commentators of all
stripes agree that “Trump’s flouting of norms . . . has become a defining feature
of his presidency,”1 perhaps even its “most consequential aspect.”2 New
watchdog groups3 and media projects4 have been established to highlight the
importance of unwritten rules and conventions for democratic governance,
and to monitor breaches. “Suddenly,” a New Yorker column remarks, “all we
hear about is ‘norms’— . . . norms violated, norms overthrown, norms thrown
back in the faces of their normalcy. Not since ‘Cheers’ went off the air, back in
the nineties, have we heard so much about Norms.”5
Concerns about a breakdown in constitutional norms long predate the
Trump presidency, however. Allegations of norm violations were a staple of
the Franklin Roosevelt6 and Richard Nixon7 administrations, for example, and

1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

6.

Emily Bazelon, How Do We Contend With Trump’s Defiance of ‘Norms’?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(July 11, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/magazine/how-do-we-contendwith-trumps-defiance-of-norms.html; see also, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Will Donald Trump
Destroy the Presidency?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2017/10/will-donald-trump-destroy-the-presidency/537921
[https://perma.cc/H4EV-9KRK] (“Donald Trump is a norm-busting president without
parallel in American history.”).
Michael Grunwald, Donald Trump Is a Consequential President. Just Not in the Ways You
Think., POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/12/30/
rating-donald-trump-year-one-2017-216199 [https://perma.cc/DAZ6-XX8Y] (“The most
consequential aspect of President Trump—like the most consequential aspect of
Candidate Trump—has been his relentless shattering of norms . . . .”); see also, e.g.,
Matthew Cooper, Joe Biden Says Donald Trump Has Trashed ‘Norms’ and Made the World
More Dangerous, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 17, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/bidensays-trump-doesnt-understand-governing-687185 [https://perma.cc/4XL8-F9GP] (“Biden
argued that Trump’s ‘breaking down of norms’ of civility is more dangerous than any
particular policy position . . . .”).
See, e.g., BRIGHT LINE WATCH, http://brightlinewatch.org [https://perma.cc/Y4U9-9N3U].
See, e.g., Katerina Wright, Norms Watch: Tracking Team Trump’s Breaches of Democratic
Traditions, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.justsecurity.org/36303/
normalization-watch [https://perma.cc/6ZR8-MQUX].
Adam Gopnik, Norms and Cliffs in Trump’s America, NEW YORKER (Aug. 3, 2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/norms-and-cliffs-in-trumps-america
[https://perma.cc/KF7S-ZVB8]. For any readers mystified by the Cheers reference, see Norm
Peterson, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norm_Peterson [https://perma.cc/3SM4MJ6N].
See Julia Azari, This President Bucked Norms and Fought His Own Party. He Wasn’t
Named Trump., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 30, 2017), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
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more recently of the so-called Gingrich Revolution in the House of
Representatives.8 Allegations of congressional norm violations have only
intensified since the 1990s, especially from the left, as levels of polarization have
increased and members of both parties have resorted repeatedly to
constitutional hardball.9 By the middle of the Obama presidency, these
uncooperative dynamics had generated “a widespread fear that the breakdown
of certain separation-of-powers conventions [was] contributing to a
breakdown of our system of representative government.”10 If Americans
“periodically (re)discover that U.S. constitutional law is heavily based on
conventions or unwritten political norms,”11 they likewise periodically
rediscover that some of those norms are subject to radical revision.
Following Philip Pettit, we can define informal norms as “regularities of
behavior in a society” that do not have the status of law but that, “as a matter
of shared awareness, most members conform to . . . , most expect others to
approve of conformity or disapprove of non-conformity, and most are
reinforced in this pattern of behavior by that expectation.”12 We can then
define informal constitutional norms (hereafter constitutional norms) as
that subset of informal norms that regulates the public behavior of actors who

7.

8.

9.
10.

11.
12.

this-president-bucked-norms-and-fought-his-own-party-he-wasnt-named-trump
[https://perma.cc/9TC4-8WDK].
See, e.g., Mark P. Lagon & Ross Harrison, As Disrupter in Chief, Trump Is No Nixon,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 18, 2017, 6:50 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/18/asdisrupter-in-chief-trump-is-no-nixon [https://perma.cc/FZ6F-AJHX]; Julian E.
Zelizer, What Is Really Unprecedented About Trump?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 27, 2017),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/what-is-really-unprecedentedabout-trump/544179 [https://perma.cc/W69N-JPYA].
See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 31–
43 (2012) (reviewing Newt Gingrich’s controversial tactics as Speaker of the House from
1995 to 1999).
See generally Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018).
David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 41 (2014); cf. E.J.
DIONNE, JR. ET AL., ONE NATION AFTER TRUMP: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED, THE
DISILLUSIONED, THE DESPERATE, AND THE NOT-YET DEPORTED 69–70 (2017) (arguing that
“Trumpism has long been in gestation,” as the Republican Party “has been undercutting
the norms of American politics for decades”).
Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1165
(2013).
PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY
128 (2012); see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (“Roughly speaking, by norms [the legal]
literature refers to informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow
because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions,
or both.”).
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wield high-level governmental authority, thereby guiding and constraining
how these actors “exercise political discretion.”13 Many such norms overlap
with what Commonwealth theorists refer to as constitutional conventions, or
the “‘unwritten norms of government practice’ that emerge in a decentralized
fashion and ‘are regularly followed out of a sense of obligation but are not
directly enforceable in court.’”14 Given that all norms, by definition, enjoy a
wide measure of approval within the relevant community and that
constitutional conventions are widely believed to “vindicate basic purposes of
the constitutional system,”15 the prospect of constitutional norms becoming
destabilized is understandably concerning.
Yet as history demonstrates, constitutional norms are perpetually in flux.16
The principal source of instability is not that they can be disregarded or
denigrated by politicians who deny their legitimacy, their validity, or their
value—although these things do sometimes happen. Rather, the principal
source of instability is that constitutional norms can be dynamically interpreted
in a more or less restrictive manner, and at higher or lower levels of generality,
and the potential for such reinterpretation puts ongoing pressure on the
integrity of the norms and their capacity to constrain the conduct of
government officials.
This Article calls attention to that latent instability and, in so doing, begins
to taxonomize and theorize the structure of constitutional norm change. We
explore some of the different modes in which unwritten norms break down (or

13.

14.

15.

16.

Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United
States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1860. Although capacious, this definition does not
collapse constitutional norms into political norms, as the public behavior of high-level
government officials is just one aspect of politics.
Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 9, at 921 (quoting David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith,
129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 930 (2016)). Constitutional norms as we define them may be a
broader category than constitutional conventions, in that the latter are sometimes said to
regulate dealings within and among government institutions, see, e.g., Jon Elster,
Unwritten Constitutional Norms 21 (undated) (unpublished manuscript)
[https://perma.cc/YPN8-764G], whereas the former are not necessarily limited to
intragovernmental interactions. For purposes of our analysis, nothing important hangs on
the distinction (to the extent it exists) between constitutional norms and constitutional
conventions.
Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump,
93 IND. L.J. 177, 190 (2018). For an insightful account of the functional roles that informal
norms play in the American political system, see Julia R. Azari & Jennifer K. Smith,
Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established Democracies, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 37
(2012).
This observation is not necessarily limited to constitutional, or even explicitly political,
norms. Consider, for instance, the ways in which norms of polite conversation or
appropriate attire change continually over time.
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solidify) in our constitutional system and the different dangers and
opportunities associated with each. Moreover, we argue that under certain
plausible conditions, it will be more worrisome when norms are subtly revised
than when they are openly flouted. This somewhat paradoxical argument
suggests that many commentators have been misjudging our current
moment: President Trump’s flagrant defiance of norms may not be as big a
threat to our constitutional democracy as the more complex, and longerrunning, deterioration of norms underway in other political institutions.
I.

BREAKING DOWN NORM BREAKDOWN: DESTRUCTION,
DECOMPOSITION, AND DISPLACEMENT

The language of norms “breaking down” masks a great deal of complexity.
As a first cut at refining our conversations on the subject, we can distinguish
among three basic ways norms change over time: when they are destroyed,
when they are decomposed, and when they are displaced.
Norm destruction occurs when a norm is flouted or repudiated and, in
consequence, ceases to exist, at least for a while. A classic example from
American history involves President Franklin Roosevelt’s disregard of the
traditional prohibition, dating back to George Washington, against presidents
serving more than two terms.17 By Roosevelt’s third and then fourth term in
office, this highly salient constitutional norm appeared to have become a relic.
Norm decomposition occurs when a norm is interpreted or applied in
ways that are held out as compliant but that, over time, substantially alter or
reduce whatever regulative force the norm previously possessed. Daphna
Renan, for instance, contends that within the executive branch, a commitment
to “OLC supremacy”—according to which the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) authoritatively resolves legal questions through
written opinions—has been overtaken in the past decade by a “porous” set of
practices that rely much less on OLC and much more on informal, interagency
working groups.18 No one ever made an explicit decision to jettison the old
method of resolving legal questions. Yet as a growing number of White House
and agency actions progressively shrank the sphere in which OLC exercises
17.
18.

See Whittington, supra note 13, at 1867–68 (“More than just an observed historical
pattern, the departure of even popular presidents after a second term of office was taken to
be normatively obligatory, central to the maintenance of the U.S. constitutional project.”).
Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805, 815–48 (2017); see also id.
at 809 (“While the myth of a supreme OLC dispensing formal legal opinions persists, the
reality is a less insulated, more diffuse, and more informal set of institutional
arrangements.”).
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binding authority, the relatively strict norm of OLC supremacy transformed,
on Renan’s account, into a relatively spongy norm of interagency
deliberativeness.
Norm destruction and norm decomposition are not strictly separate
categories, but rather sit toward either end of a continuum of norm change. In
an ideal-typical case of norm destruction, the preexisting pattern of behavior is
openly and flagrantly renounced and never again restored. In an ideal-typical
case of norm decomposition, the preexisting pattern of behavior is
incrementally and imperceptibly tweaked until, at some point far down the line,
the aggregation of all those tweaks yields a new normative pattern, one that
informed observers would agree is a departure from the status quo ante. Most
cases of norm change fall well between these poles. It is worth recalling in this
regard that in the decades before President Roosevelt blew through the norm of
the two-term presidency, the norm itself was becoming “increasingly murky” as
new questions arose concerning nonconsecutive terms and partial terms of
office.19 An extreme case of norm destruction was preceded by a much more
ambiguous process of norm decomposition. Moreover, as the next Part
explains, there are multiple aspects of any given norm that may be contested at
any given time and thus multiple dimensions to the destructiondecomposition continuum. We term these dimensions axes of instability.
Although certain norms may be relatively stable over long stretches—and may
even be internalized to the point that no one contemplates defying them20—the
potential for endogenous change always exists and, for many norms at many
junctures, is activated to some degree. Norms are constantly being composed,
decomposed, and recomposed in our constitutional system.
Informal norms may also lose force not because they are destroyed or
decomposed, but because they are displaced by law. The norm of the two-term

19.

20.

Whittington, supra note 13, at 1868. Even after President Roosevelt successfully ran for a
third term in 1940, some may have wondered whether the two-term norm was not “dead
forever,” as his general election opponent insisted, see MICHAEL J. KORZI, PRESIDENTIAL
TERM LIMITS IN AMERICAN HISTORY: POWER, PRINCIPLES, AND POLITICS 93 (2011) (quoting
Wendell Willkie), but rather deemed “inapplicable in times of economic stress and with
rumours of war abroad.” Joseph Jaconelli, The Nature of Constitutional Convention, 19
LEGAL STUD. 24, 33 (1999). If this alternative understanding had taken hold, then
Roosevelt would not have fully destroyed the norm so much as severely decomposed it by
establishing a broad exception. That is to say, if people from across the political spectrum
tend to characterize Roosevelt’s third election as norm destructive, this is not because it is
the only possible way to characterize the historical data, but because we have come to a
relatively high degree of consensus about the nature and significance of Roosevelt’s
behavior vis-à-vis the behaviors of prior presidents.
See Pozen, supra note 10, at 69–70; Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1190–91.
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presidency again supplies an example, as President Roosevelt’s breach of the
norm led in short order to its codification in the Twenty-Second Amendment.21
Additionally, institutions sometimes choose to displace their own norms. In
the early 1970s, at the height of the executive branch’s credibility gap and
President Nixon’s conflicts with the press, DOJ issued guidelines clarifying
and formalizing its practice of limiting the number of subpoenas issued to
journalists.22 As these examples reflect, when norms are converted by judges,
legislators, regulators, or constitutional amenders into legally binding
directives, it is often in response to a perceived or feared breakdown.23
Table 1. Modes of Norm Change
Mode

Example

Destruction

Two-term presidency  Roosevelt’s third and
fourth terms

Decomposition

OLC supremacy  porous legalism

Displacement by law

Prosecutorial restraint  DOJ media subpoena
guidelines

If it seems odd to think that constitutional norms are constantly evolving
and devolving, the basic idea can be analogized to the well-known
phenomenon of rules-standards convergence. Legal rules are designed by their

21.
22.

23.

See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1 (“No person shall be elected to the office of the President
more than twice . . . .”).
See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 538 (2013) (discussing the
development of DOJ’s media subpoena guidelines, now codified at 28 C.F.R. § 50.10
(2017)). This might be understood as an example of executive self-binding to stave off
more stringent measures by other actors, such as legislatures or courts. See id. at 539 n.142,
573–77 (suggesting this interpretation); cf. Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered
Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV.
801, 895–96 (2011) (considering motivations for and types of “executive self-constraints”).
See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Third Bound, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1949, 1963 (2016) (“[T]he
increasing breakdown of intragovernmental conventions of reciprocal cooperation
between the parties . . . has brought about the explicit legalization and juridification of a
number of executive-power questions that were previously within the domain of
convention.”).
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drafters to be clear and precise; legal standards are designed by their drafters to
be open ended and context sensitive. Yet in practice, as many scholars have
noted, “these regulatory strategies gradually bleed into one another, as rules
become riddled with qualifications and exceptions that reduce their clarity and
standards become concretized through interpretations and understandings
that reduce their flexibility.”24 So, too, can what were once crystalline informal
norms (“Always consult OLC!”) decompose into muddier formulations
(“Consult OLC when feasible” or “Seek advice from some legal office”), and
vice versa. The analogy is imperfect, though. Because most legal directives are
promulgated through a formal process and then subject to interpretation
within an established judicial hierarchy, there is often a canonical statement of a
directive at its origin and a subsequent body of written precedent that can be
consulted to assess whether the directive has become more rule-like or
standard-like.
Informal norms, in contrast, generally arise as “the unplanned,
unexpected result of . . . interactions,”25 and they may never be reduced to
writing or brought before a body with acknowledged interpretive primacy. It
therefore can be quite difficult to pin down what a norm prescribes or
proscribes, beyond some core set of behaviors and expectations, or to
determine how its current contours map onto those of prior iterations.
Constitutional norms plainly do become more or less constraining over time as
new actors apply them in new circumstances; like Renan has done in her study
of OLC,26 we can trace their decomposition and recomposition, as well as
sometimes their destruction. But as compared to judicially enforced
constitutional commands, their informality may make it harder to assess when
a breakdown has occurred and to what extent.
II.

BREAKING DOWN NORM BREAKDOWN: AXES OF INSTABILITY

We have suggested that constitutional norms are dynamic in nature and
that norm decomposition is a pervasive phenomenon.27 In more and less subtle
24.

25.
26.
27.

Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of
Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1869 (2016). See generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Frederick Schauer, The
Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303; Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).
Cristina Bicchieri & Ryan Muldoon, Social Norms, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-norms (last visited Aug. 30, 2018).
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Again, although this Article concerns constitutional norms, the basic point generalizes
beyond the constitutional context. For the suggestion that U.S. administrative law norms

How Constitutional Norms Break Down

1439

ways, government officials are constantly reformulating, reinterpreting, and
renegotiating their relationships with one another and with nongovernmental
actors and institutions. Outright norm destruction, on the other hand, appears
to be a significantly rarer phenomenon. As evidence of this, consider how
frequently discussions of norm destruction in American constitutional politics
turn to the same one example noted above: Roosevelt’s election to a third
presidential term.28
These two phenomena—the relative paucity of clear instances of norm
destruction and the relative ubiquity of norm decomposition—are deeply
related. If constitutional norms are constantly in flux and if perceived breaches
trigger disapproval, as well as other possible sanctions,29 rational politicians
will generally seek to describe their own strategic behavior as consistent with
prior practice. By the same token, their opponents will seek to describe that
behavior as unprecedented. And because both sets of claims rest on “particular,
contestable constructions of the past,”30 both may be plausible. Unambiguous
cases of constitutional norm destruction are so rare, then, not only because of
the pressures on government officials to comply with norms and to be seen to
comply, but also because all judgments about norm following and norm violating
are subject to such interpretive contestation (again, usually in the absence of an
authoritative adjudicator). The best one can do in making the case for a
“breakdown” is to try to offer a persuasive account of how contemporary
patterns of behavior deviate from a larger historical pattern in which they are
embedded.31
But if we abstract from specific cases, we can also make some headway in
elucidating the internal structure of norm breakdown. In particular, we can
identify several axes of instability for any given norm, concerning (1) what
conduct the norm prescribes or proscribes, (2) to whom the norm applies, and

28.

29.
30.
31.

have proven similarly dynamic in recent years, see Mila Sohoni, The Administrative
Constitution in Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 945 (2016) (discussing scholarship on
the emergence of “novel and unorthodox administrative forms and structures”).
See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 107–08, 138 (2018);
Azari & Smith, supra note 15, at 44–45; Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Arrogance, 164
U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1672 & n.124 (2016); Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality,
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1099–100 (2013); Siegel, supra note 15, at 181–82; Whittington,
supra note 13, at 1867–69.
See Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1182 (noting that constitutional norms “are enforced by
the threat of political sanctions, such as defeat in reelection [or] retaliation by other
political institutions and actors”).
Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a Usable
Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 97 (2017).
See id. at 130–32 (making a similar point with regard to claims of “unprecedentedness”).
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(3) when the norm is liable to be overridden. These axes largely crosscut
the destruction-decomposition continuum, such that it is possible for a
norm to be destroyed or decomposed along each axis. The axes themselves,
moreover, are not fully distinct: They overlap with each other to some extent
conceptually as well as in practice. We believe that it is nevertheless useful to
pull them apart, to give a fuller sense of the varieties of norm breakdown.32
The first, and often the most salient, axis on which norms can break down
involves their content, or the particular behaviors that are believed to be
required or prohibited. As British scholars have observed, “constitutional
conventions . . . are beset with problems of defining their true content.”33 Some
of these problems follow from the ineliminable potential for future vagueness
and uncertainty that besets all norms.34 Ever since the failure of President
Roosevelt’s 1937 plan to expand the Supreme Court by as many as six justices,
for instance, many assume that there has been a constitutional norm against
“court packing.”35 But what exactly does this disallow? While close replicas of
Roosevelt’s plan would pretty plainly violate any such norm, recent events
suggest that it is less clear whether and how the norm applies to efforts to
expand the size of lower federal courts.36 More generally, changes to a norm’s

32.

33.
34.
35.

36.

To be clear, in laying out these axes of instability, we do not claim to be illuminating the
notoriously difficult question of why unwritten norms arise and then persist or
change. We hope to shed a little light, rather, on the more formalist question of how
norms change. Moreover, when we refer to specific norms in the discussion that follows,
we are not doing the hard work of historical-political sociology that would be needed to
argue persuasively that these norms existed and have broken down or are breaking down.
We are simply positing that these norms have evolved in the manner described, as a means
of illustrating the different dimensions on which norms can be destroyed or decomposed.
Jaconelli, supra note 19, at 32.
See generally Frederick Schauer, On the Open Texture of Law, 87 GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE
STUDIEN 197 (2013).
See Pozen, supra note 10, at 34, 38, 69; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical
Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255,
269–87 (2017) (reviewing the role that appeals to constitutional conventions played in the
debate over Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan). It bears note that even as to the premise that
Roosevelt’s plan was a failure, significant interpretive contestation remains. See, e.g.,
Chafetz, supra note 30, at 124–25.
Compare Steven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji, Judicial Appointments After Judge Robert H.
Bork, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2017), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/judicialappointments-after-judge.html [https://perma.cc/B7HP-EM29] (defending a proposal to
expand the size of the circuit and district courts as consistent with “past practice and
norms of conventional behavior”), with Richard Primus, Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and
Endgames: A Constitutional Analysis of the Calabresi-Hirji Judgeship Proposal, HARV. L.
REV. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2017), http://blog.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-andendgames-a-constitutional-analysis-of-the-calabresi-hirji-judgeship-proposal
[https://perma.cc/WN8F-3FTD] (“[I]t is . . . clear that the [Calabresi-Hirji] proposal
threatens the permanent unraveling of a settlement that has made legitimate judicial
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institutional or political context or to the incentives of relevant actors can, over
time, change understandings—as well as reveal or create disagreements—as to
what counts as compliance. The filibuster furnishes an important example. For
most of Senate history, filibusters were employed sparingly and viewed as “the
tool of last resort.”37 By the early twenty-first century, filibusters and threats of
filibusters had become routine,38 even as senators from both parties continued
to denounce their “excessive” use.39 The norm against ready recourse to the
filibuster lingered on, yet as the tool became increasingly useful to increasingly
organized minority parties,40 a long series of decisions by a long list of senators
unsettled assumptions about how much filibustering was “too much” and
watered down the norm to the point of near collapse.
A second axis on which norms can break down involves their coverage, or
the identities of the actors whose behavior is regulated.41 While certain
constitutional norms—such as cooperation or coordination equilibria in
bilateral repeated games42—will tend to apply to a relatively fixed set of actors,
the identity of the individuals subject to other norms may be more fluid, with
potentially significant practical and political implications. Thus, a norm
against “White House” interference with DOJ’s criminal investigations could
become substantially less constraining depending on which officials are

37.
38.
39.

40.
41.

42.

review possible for a century and a half.”). As this controversy reflects, debates over the
content of a norm will sometimes involve debates over the norm’s scope and how broadly
or narrowly to construe precedents. Constitutional scholars likewise recently debated
whether Senate Republicans’ refusal to consider Judge Merrick Garland’s nomination to
the Supreme Court violated a norm of providing timely advice and consent on such
nominations (or any number of more precise permutations of that norm). See Chafetz,
supra note 30, at 106–09, 128–30 (reviewing this episode and the associated constitutional
controversy).
WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 304 (9th ed. 2014).
See id. at 304–05; Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV.
1003, 1008–11 (2011).
See, e.g., The Facts of Senate Dysfunction, SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM. (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/the-facts-of-senate-dysfunction [https://perma.cc/
5CQA-4SVL] (disputing Senate Democrats’ claim that Republicans had made “excessive
use of the filibuster in the 112th Congress” and arguing that the majority leader’s
“unilateral and often unnecessary choice[s] to file cloture” were to blame).
See generally GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN
THE HOUSE AND SENATE 37–187 (2010).
Note that this axis is not implicated by the current controversy over court packing. People
may debate whether and how the anti-court-packing norm applies to lower courts, see
supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text, but no one has been debating whose behavior
the norm regulates: the behavior of presidents and members of Congress. In our
terminology, the anti-court-packing norm has been experiencing instability as to its
content and scope, but not as to its coverage.
Cf. Elster, supra note 14, at 36–43 (analyzing certain constitutional conventions as
coordination and cooperation equilibria); Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1186–89 (similar).
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considered part of the White House for purposes of the norm.43 A more visible
example of norm decomposition along this axis might be a declining sense that
candidates for the presidency ought to be civil in their dealings with each
other.44 Even if understandings of what constitutes civility or incivility do not
change, and the content of the norm against incivility remains stable in that
sense, these particular actors may no longer believe the norm to be relevant to
their own interactions, or relevant to the same degree as before. Still more
dramatically, one could interpret various statements by President Trump
suggesting that he sees himself as a world-historical figure whose greatness will
brook no interference—that the standard rules of politics simply do not apply
to him—as norm destructive along this axis.45
A final axis on which norms can break down involves their override
conditions and the willingness of actors to derogate from the norms’ ordinary
strictures. As Adrian Vermeule has suggested, under certain circumstances
“even genuine conventions” may be defeasible—may be openly “qualified,
overridden, or breached”—without necessarily being destroyed or eliciting a
severe sanction.46 If changes in the institutional environment, the wider world,
or the views of relevant segments of the public raise the expected cost of
adherence to a norm, such circumstances may arise with greater frequency and
thereby weaken the norm’s regulative force. Over the course of his
administration, for example, President Obama became increasingly willing to
take measures that pushed the boundaries of executive power, on the theory
that unprecedented obstructionism by congressional Republicans licensed or

43.

44.

45.

46.

See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 110-203, at 2–3 (2007) (describing a dramatic expansion under
President George W. Bush of the number of officials potentially excluded from this norm). On
the norm generally, see Bruce Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the
Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3126856;
Andrew McCanse Wright, Justice Department Independence and White House Control
(Feb. 18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3125848.
See, e.g., A Modest Suggestion, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.washington
times.com/news/2016/mar/6/editorial-presidential-candidates-should-try-civil
[https://perma.cc/8YWY-CPYD] (“Candidates for president . . . [now] speak in schoolyard
expletives. Newspapers, once the arbiters of public discourse, no longer flinch at printing
the vilest blasphemy and cursing . . . .”).
Put differently, a politician’s claim to be a Schmittian sovereign may amount to a claim
that constitutional norms (as well as legally binding constitutional rules) do not apply to
her. See Noa Ben-Asher, Legalism and Decisionism in Crisis, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 699, 711–12
(2010). Some have interpreted Donald Trump’s boast upon accepting the Republican
presidential nomination that “I alone can fix it” as such a claim. Transcript: Donald Trump
at the G.O.P. Convention, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/
22/us/politics/trump-transcript-rnc-address.html.
Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1184.
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even required him to exercise particular forms of “self-help.”47 The
intransigence of these Republicans and the frustrations of Democratic voters
and legislators made it politically rational, from Obama’s perspective, to
reconsider a range of constitutional norms that were inhibiting government
action as part of his “We Can’t Wait” campaign.48 Across both the Democratic
and Republican coalitions, more broadly, the waning influence of traditional
party insiders may be putting pressure on elected officials to rethink their
compliance with norms of interparty and interbranch restraint in a growing
number of situations.49
Table 2. Axes of Norm Instability
Axis

Decomposition
Involves . . .

What conduct does the
norm prescribe or
proscribe?

A growing set of arguably
irregular behaviors are
claimed to be compliant.

Norm against
“excessive” use of
Senate filibusters

A growing set of actors
are claimed not to be
subject to the norm.
A growing set of
circumstances are
claimed to justify
qualifying or breaching
the norm.

Norm against “White
House” interference
with DOJ
Norms against
executive unilateralism
during President
Obama’s “We Can’t
Wait” campaign

To whom does the
norm apply?

When is the norm liable
to be overridden?

Example

Each of these axes of instability has an analogue in the context of legally
binding directives, but the discrepancies between law and norms mean that
they work in somewhat different ways. This difference is likely smallest
along the axis of changed content. As already mentioned,50 the literature on
rules-standards convergence has shown how interpreters and enforcers
routinely change the effective meaning of legal directives even in the absence of
a formal amendment, so that, for example, a rule that says “Speed limit 55”

47.
48.
49.
50.

See Pozen, supra note 10, at 4–8, 41–47.
Id.
See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 9, at 944–51.
See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
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comes over time to mean something more like “Do not drive recklessly and in
any case don’t exceed 70.”
Legal instability based on shifting understandings of whom a law regulates
is less common but not altogether unfamiliar. Consider in this vein recent
debates over whether the federal antinepotism statute applies to positions in the
White House51 and whether the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause applies
to the president or only to officers serving under the president.52 Or consider
the recent extension to same-sex couples of the constitutional right to marry.53
Both the generality that is characteristic of promulgated law and the possibility
of an authoritative interpretation of a law’s reach by a body such as the Supreme
Court or OLC, however, limit legal instability on this axis at any point in time.
Breakdowns based on shifting understandings of a law’s override conditions
are still less familiar, at least in the constitutional context. For it is a fundamental
feature of contemporary American constitutionalism—and itself a constitutional
norm—that “government officeholders and aspirants cannot, if they wish to
remain politically viable, . . . admit to violating the Constitution, or even to having
doubts about the wisdom of following the Constitution.”54 Although officials
may well take liberties in construing any given constitutional provision, they
virtually never suggest (explicitly, at least55) that the Constitution’s commands
should be qualified, set aside, or breached in light of practical exigencies or
changed circumstances.56

51.

52.
53.
54.

55.

56.

See Melina Delkic & Alex Mallin, Nepotism Laws Don’t Apply to Jared Kushner
Appointment, DOJ Says, ABC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2017, 4:14 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/nepotism-laws-apply-jared-kushner-appointment-doj/story?id=44951811
[https://perma.cc/2MQK-ATSQ].
See Seth Barrett Tillman & Steven G. Calabresi, Debate, The Great Divorce: The Current
Understanding of Separation of Powers and the Original Meaning of the Incompatibility
Clause, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 134 (2008).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 941 (2016); see also
Pozen, supra note 10, at 66–67 (explaining that while U.S. government officials sometimes
respond to perceived norm violations by other officials with norm violations of their own,
it is never considered legitimate to respond with violations of legally binding constitutional
constraints).
Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret History of American Constitutional Skepticism: A
Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 85–86 (2014) (arguing that
while the “skeptical tradition” in American constitutionalism may appear to have died out
in the modern period, it persists “beneath the surface”).
As Robert Cover famously chronicled, even abolitionist judges in the antebellum period
felt constrained to issue proslavery rulings on account of their situatedness in the legal
system writ large. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
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Thinking in terms of axes of instability, then, not only allows us to begin to
taxonomize norm breakdown; it also allows us to clarify a number of
similarities and dissimilarities between legal change and norm change. And
with this finer-grained picture of the latter phenomenon in view, we might
begin to refine our judgments about specific cases. In particular, we might gain
some purchase on the question of what sorts of norm breakdowns ought to
worry us most, and under what circumstances.
III.

SOME NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF NORM INSTABILITY

Our most basic evaluative claim is that it is difficult to make strong
normative claims about norm stability or instability in the abstract. After all,
the mere fact that members of a community conform to certain behavioral
regularities and disapprove of nonconformity does not make those
behavioral regularities good. At points in American history, perhaps including
the present, constitutional norms have helped entrench everything from white
supremacism to patriarchal gender relations to the marginalization of the
poor.57 Moreover, the observation that many of today’s constitutional norms
are very different from those that obtained at earlier points in American
history58 should caution against a too-easy assumption that prevailing practices
are desirable or that their breakdown would necessarily be regrettable.59

57.

58.
59.

For instance, to the extent that there is a constitutional or political norm against
officeholders’ labeling racism as such except in the most extreme circumstances, it will
tend to legitimize and reinforce various forms of racism, especially structural racism.
Consider in this regard the condemnation that President Obama faced in 2009, eventually
leading to White House backpedaling, when he implied that police racism was to blame for
the arrest of Henry Louis Gates Jr. outside Gates’s own home. See Christina Bellantoni,
Gates Remark Steals Focus for Obama—Police Unions Voice Anger, WASH. TIMES, July 24,
2009, at A1. For this reason, white supremacists have made assiduous efforts to maintain
this norm. See Gene Demby, Is It Racist to Call Someone ‘Racist’?, NPR: CODE SWITCH
(Nov. 23, 2016, 6:47 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2016/11/23/
503180254/is-it-racist-to-call-someone-racist; see also Aziz Huq, Conventions as a
Consequence of the Incomplete Nature of Constitutional Bargains 4–5 (2018)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (suggesting that certain constitutional
conventions, including the House of Representatives’s pre–Civil War “gag rule” forbidding
the consideration of antislavery petitions, have entrenched “rotten compromises”); Corey
Robin, Democracy Is Norm Erosion, COREY ROBIN BLOG (Jan. 28, 2018),
http://coreyrobin.com/2018/01/28/democracy-is-norm-erosion [https://perma.cc/F8LB2RLH] (describing abolitionist and Reconstructionist politics from the 1850s through the
1870s as “a politics of norm-shattering”).
See, e.g., Azari & Smith, supra note 15, at 48 (describing the radical shift in the public role
of the presidency over the past century).
Cf. JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 6 (2017) (“[I]lluminating both the fact of change across time and
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Whatever one’s moral priors or views on government, one is likely to find fault
with at least some of the constitutional norms in effect at any given moment.60
Democracy, in the words of political theorist Corey Robin, is among other
things “a permanent project of norm erosion”61—and, we would add, norm
reconstruction.
Even so, one might believe that there are important general advantages to
norm stability. Norm stability could be defended, for instance, on Burkean
grounds.
In Anthony Kronman’s telling, Burke subscribed to “the
ancient . . . idea that the past has an authority of its own which, however
circumscribed, is inherent and direct rather than derivative.”62 The mere
existence of a norm, on this view, provides a presumptive reason to preserve it.
Sounding a Burkean note, leading theorists of constitutional conventions have
suggested that deviating from them amounts to “a breach of ‘constitutional
morality’”63 or a failure of “institutional citizenship.”64 Related to the Burkean
rationale might be an Oakeshottian one, or the idea that the rejection of
prevailing rules in favor of something “better” represents a form of epistemic
hubris, one that mistakenly applies abstract reasoning when practical reasoning
is called for and thereby threatens to bring on a much worse state of political

60.

61.
62.

63.

64.

the agency and contingency that have factored into that change . . . is a useful corrective to
accounts of politics that treat extant institutional arrangements as inevitable. Contingency
creates room for effective critique . . . .”).
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
991, 1033 (2008) (explaining that “there is no reason to expect that interaction between
national lawmaking institutions will tend to produce anything like efficient,” or social
welfare-maximizing, “customs or norms”); Pozen, supra note 10, at 80–81 (“Longstanding
interbranch norms . . . may be workable and attractive to a Burkean traditionalist, yet
suboptimal from any number of perspectives. On some readings of the Constitution, they
may even be unlawful.” (footnote omitted)).
Robin, supra note 57.
Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047 (1990). Kronman
describes this idea as “now largely discredited.” Id. But see Gerald J. Postema, On the
Moral Presence of Our Past, 36 MCGILL L.J. 1153, 1156, 1160 (1991) (arguing that “[i]n law,
as in much of the rest of our lives, the past is present in our moral or practical deliberations
in the form of precedent” and that “[t]he moral force of precedent must be, at least to some
degree, independent of the merits of the decision”).
Bradley & Siegel, supra note 35, at 266 (quoting A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 346 (London, MacMillan & Co. 3d ed. 1889)). This
suggestion is especially plausible when the convention violator has benefited from others’
adherence to the convention in the past; such cases may implicate not only considerations
of institutional continuity and functioning but also the internal morality of promise
keeping, even if the promise is only implicit. From an external perspective, however, if the
bargain reflected in a constitutional convention seems likely to generate bad policy or like a
cartel deal, it is unclear why anyone who is not party to the bargain would be morally
committed to its maintenance.
Siegel, supra note 15, at 189.
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affairs.65 One might accordingly assume that, all else equal, more norm
instability is clearly worse than less norm instability and that norm destruction
is clearly worse than norm decomposition. Norm destruction can upend
settled behavioral patterns quickly and dramatically, as in the case of President
Roosevelt’s third term. Norm decomposition occurs relatively quietly and
incrementally—indeed, those who are reinterpreting the norm will tend to
deny that any change is occurring—and thus the damage to constitutional
expectations and small-c conservative values may be relatively modest.
This is not wholly off base. We do not dismiss the content-independent
rationales for norm stability, nor do we deny that there are good reasons to be
concerned about norm destruction. Such concerns may be especially acute
when it appears that a norm is being undermined out of narrow personal or
partisan self-interest. But the dynamic character of constitutional norms does
provide some reason to be skeptical of theories that would valorize
constitutional norm continuity as such. Given, for example, the way in which
norms about acceptable levels of legislative obstruction by the minority party
have fluctuated throughout American history,66 it is not clear why a maneuver
that departs from the immediately preceding period’s patterns of obstruction
should cause alarm on that basis alone.
In addition, and somewhat paradoxically, if one is enamored of a
constitutional norm in its current form—or, at least, if one thinks that it is
superior to the likely alternatives—then spectacular efforts to destroy that norm
may be less troubling than subtler efforts to decompose it. The basic reason is

65.

66.

See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 5 (Liberty Fund rev. ed. 1991). Other rationales have been put forward for the
desirability of norm stability, including the fostering of intragovernmental cooperation
and coordination, the promotion of accountability and efficiency, and the avoidance of titfor-tat retaliatory cycles. See, e.g., GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS:
THE RULES AND FORMS OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (1984) (cooperation); id. at 18, 210
(accountability); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative
Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (1997) (efficiency).
These virtues are not features of norms qua norms, however, but rather features of
particular norms. For instance, it is entirely possible to have norms against cooperation
and coordination. Norms that enable certain forms of agency independence, notably,
disable corresponding forms of collaboration with other arms of the state. See generally
Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1194–214. Likewise, the efficiency of norms depends on their
content and context. See generally, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico,
Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
2027 (2001) (describing scenarios in which decentralized processes are unlikely to produce
efficient norms). To make a case for the inherent social value of norm stability, and
therefore for the inherent undesirability of norm erosion, one must point to virtues that
are not contingent in this way.
See CHAFETZ, supra note 59, at 280–90, 296–301; Chafetz, supra note 30, at 111–19.
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that behaviors seen as flouting a constitutional norm will almost invariably
have greater salience, both among political elites and the public at large, than
incremental revisions or refinements. This salience differential means that a
norm flouter is highly likely to face questions from, and to have to offer
justifications to, her political opponents. Such critical dialogue is less likely to
be sparked by norm decompositions, which, as discussed above, are generally
asserted to be norm compliance. Insofar as vigorous public debate improves
decisionmaking, apparent attempts to destroy a constitutional norm may
produce better or more democratic outcomes than attempts to modify its
content or coverage.67
Related to, and enabled by, the greater salience associated with norm
flouting is the greater likelihood of backlash. This backlash could take any
number of forms, from media outcry to protests in the streets to the use of
institutional leverage by other government actors (including by displacing the
imperiled norm with a binding legal directive); and it could be sited in any
number of institutions, from civil society groups to the courts to the legislature.
The typically greater transparency and simplicity of norm destruction are thus
valuable not only in themselves, from the perspective of public comprehension
and deliberation, but also instrumentally for triggering sanctions. Publicitydependent enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to work as well in cases of
decomposition.
For a simple set of reasons, then, norm-decomposing maneuvers may in
many instances be more worrisome than norm-flouting maneuvers. Only the
latter reliably generate their own correctives.68 We believe this argument has
67.

68.

This is loosely analogous to David Dyzenhaus’s argument that legal grey holes—situations
in which “there are some legal constraints on executive action . . . but the constraints are so
insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases”—can be even
worse than the “lawless void” of black holes. DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 42 (2006). For Dyzenhaus, this is because the
creation of law-free zones may force government actors to state a politically unacceptable
truth, while grey holes allow them to “have [their] cake and eat it too” by achieving the
same functional result without being held accountable for it. Id.; see also David Dyzenhaus,
Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2005, 2025–26 (2006). Likewise, norm decomposition may have the same endpoint as
norm destruction, but without drawing nearly as much scrutiny or debate.
In a recent essay, Vermeule draws a sharp distinction between what he calls
extragovernmental and intragovernmental conventions. “Some conventions are indeed
enforced by the threat of moralized outrage on the part of the diffuse mass of public
opinion,” he writes; “let us call those extragovernmental conventions.” Vermeule, supra
note 23, at 1956. “Other conventions are enforced by the credible threat of retaliation from
the other political party, another branch of the government, or some other institutional
actor, even as to issues about which the general public is largely oblivious. . . . We might
call those intragovernmental conventions.” Id. (footnote omitted). Yet conventions are
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important implications for American constitutional practice generally and the
Trump administration specifically. Before turning to Trump, however, we
hasten to note several crucial complications. First, the argument itself
generates something of an endogeneity problem. If attempted norm
destruction is not as worrisome as attempted norm decomposition because of
the distinctive pushback it generates, it may become worse precisely to the
extent that civil society actors internalize this point and refocus their energies away
from combatting attempted destructions and toward combatting decompositions.
Moreover, because there is no bright line separating destruction from
decomposition, political struggles over allegedly counternormative behaviors
not only will be shaped by perceptions of whether those behaviors amount to
destruction or decomposition, but also may shape those very perceptions.
Second, norm flouting and norm decomposition need not be mutually
exclusive. If the flouting of one set of norms by one actor leads that same actor
or her political allies to engage in more opportunistic behavior with respect to
other norms—if it complements rather than substitutes for decomposition—
there may be cause for greater, rather than lesser, concern. On the other hand,
insofar as norm flouting generates broad critique and backlash, norm
decomposition that is coupled with norm flouting may actually be less
successful than norm decomposition on its own, depending on partisan and
ideological alignments.
Third, flouting can succeed. If desirable norms are flouted frequently
enough with enough success, we have a significant problem no matter how
transparent the flouting or how vigorous the backlash. And one might wonder
whether various attributes of today’s political and informational environment,
such as high levels of partisan polarization or the rise of media “filter bubbles,”
have decreased the odds that the flouting of desirable constitutional norms will
be effectively repulsed.
As this last complication implies, the argument that constitutional norm
decomposition is more worrisome than constitutional norm flouting will hold
only under certain sociopolitical conditions. Specifying these conditions in any
detail would be an enormously challenging, multidisciplinary task. But at a
minimum, the argument presupposes that democratic institutions are in
reasonably good working order, with basically functioning electoral systems, a
strong press and civil society, and dispersion of power across government

not necessarily one or the other. Virtually any constitutional convention has the potential
to take on an “extragovernmental” dimension if a high-level official sets out to destroy it, as
in our political culture such efforts are apt to arouse public opinion.
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bodies. If these baseline conditions fail, the mechanisms of deliberation and
disputation are far less likely to materialize and far less likely to have any impact
if they do.
As the next Part explains, the experience of the first year and a half of the
Trump administration suggests that these baseline conditions continue to
obtain in the United States. This is consistent with Aziz Huq and Tom
Ginsburg’s conclusion that the United States has relatively strong legal and
institutional safeguards against what they call “authoritarian reversion,”
involving “a wholesale, rapid collapse into authoritarianism.”69 Instead, Huq
and Ginsburg contend, the more plausible danger in the United States is
“constitutional retrogression,” involving an incremental “decay in [the] basic
predicates of democracy,” such as “autonomous bureaucratic capacity” and a
“shared epistemic foundation.”70 The irony here is that if explicit efforts to
destroy constitutional norms in America today are less dangerous than many
assume, seeing them as a fundamental threat to the republic is apt to distract us
from other risks and thereby make efforts to decompose constitutional norms
even more dangerous.
IV.

REASSESSING THREATS TO CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS
IN THE AGE OF TRUMP

Let us now bring the analysis fully up to the present: What does our
account of norm breakdown suggest about constitutional norms in the age of
Trump?
Descriptively, President Trump’s critics are not wrong to insist that he has
flouted a large number of norms.71 Yet given our skepticism about strong
versions of theories that venerate constitutional norm stability as such,72 we
believe that the more important criticisms look to the substance of his
transgressions. In other words, if Trump’s defiance of constitutional norms
is unusually disturbing, it is not so much because these norms are norms as
because they are beneficial.73

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78,
83, 100–17 (2018).
Id. at 83, 117–62.
See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text.
In a similar spirit, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have emphasized that while President
Trump “was a serial norm breaker” during his first year in office, where he “really stands
out from his predecessors is in his willingness to challenge . . . norms that are essential to
the health of democracy.” LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 28, at 195.
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Without delving too deeply into political or moral theory, we think we can
safely say that it is bad for a president or presidential candidate to: lie
constantly,74 deny the validity of fairly administered elections,75 threaten to jail
political opponents,76 maintain business interests while in public office in a
manner that invites foreign governments and political allies to funnel money
toward those interests,77 make racist remarks and wink at white supremacists,78
strive to delegitimize the press,79 invite a foreign government to interfere in
American electoral processes,80 appoint unqualified friends and family
members to important government positions,81 and so on. Individually, these

74.

75.

76.
77.

78.

79.
80.
81.

For a running tally of President Trump’s lies in office, see Daniel Dale, Donald Trump Has
Said ____ False Things as U.S. President, TORONTO STAR, http://projects.thestar.com/donaldtrump-fact-check/index.html (last updated Aug. 29, 2018) [https://perma.cc/K68Z-QEZH]
(counting 2436 false statements by President Trump at the time of this Article’s
publication).
See, e.g., Chas Danner, Donald Trump Falsely Blames Popular-Vote Loss on Voter Fraud,
N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 27, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/11/donald-trumpblames-popular-vote-loss-on-voter-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/V2YK-Q9AV]; Richard
L. Hasen, Trump’s Voting Investigation Is a Great Idea, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/01/trump_s_voting
_fraud_investigation_is_a_great_idea.html [https://perma.cc/QVL6-STSG].
See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Threat to Jail Clinton Smacks of ‘Tin-Pot Dictators,’ Experts Say,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/11/us/politics/donaldtrump-hillary-clinton-special-prosecutor.html.
See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold & Jonathan O’Connell, Nine Questions About President
Trump’s Businesses and Possible Conflicts of Interest, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2018),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/nine-questions-about-president-trumpsbusinesses-and-possible-conflicts-of-interest/2018/01/29/f8b2a3a8-014f-11e8-9d31d72cf78dbeee_story.html [https://perma.cc/Z37V-ZE3E].
See, e.g., Dylan Scott, “Shithole” Countries, Donald Trump’s Latest Racist Tirade, Explained,
VOX (Jan. 12, 2018, 11:40 AM), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/12/
16882840/donald-trump-shithole-daca [https://perma.cc/H3VR-4UPL]; Glenn Thrush &
Maggie Haberman, Trump Gives White Supremacists an Unequivocal Boost, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 15, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-charlottesvillewhite-nationalists.html.
See, e.g., Steve Coll, Donald Trump’s “Fake News” Tactics, NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/11/donald-trumps-fake-news-tactics
[https://perma.cc/2U7U-Z6RF].
See, e.g., Ashley Parker & David E. Sanger, Donald Trump Calls on Russia to Find Hillary
Clinton’s Missing Emails, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/28/us/politics/donald-trump-russia-clinton-emails.html.
See, e.g., Peter Baker et al., Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump: Pillars of Family-Driven West
Wing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/us/politics/ jaredkushner-ivanka-trump-white-house.html; David Faris, Trump’s White House Is a
Hurricane of Dysfunction and Incompetence, WEEK (July 31, 2017), http://the
week.com/articles/715385/trumps-white-house-hurricane-dysfunction-incompetence
[https://perma.cc/YV8P-REC6]; Paul Waldman, Donald Trump Has Assembled the Worst
Cabinet in American History, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
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violations of unwritten rules are dismaying. Combined, they amount to a
wholesale assault on the ideal of a constitutionally restrained and responsible
executive. President Trump, we might say, is a constitutional norm flouter
par excellence.
At the same time, and as our analysis in the preceding Part would predict,
Trump’s presidency has been marked by impassioned resistance to his norm
flouting. By a variety of metrics, many civil society organizations are stronger
than they have been in quite some time, in a manner attributable to—and
facilitative of—pushback against President Trump. Daniel Dale, the reporter
who has most assiduously tracked Trump’s lies,82 is emphatic that the lies
“haven’t worked,” given, among other things, polling data that suggest
Americans overwhelmingly view Trump as untrustworthy and have become
more accepting, not less, of Muslims and other groups he has denigrated.83
Public interest journalism has flourished in the face of Trump’s attacks, as
subscriptions and donations to media outlets ranging from the New York Times
to the Wall Street Journal to Mother Jones to ProPublica have spiked since his
election,84 and the Washington Post’s David Fahrenthold won a Pulitzer Prize
(and a cult following) for his reporting on Trump’s misrepresentations of his
charitable giving.85 Donations to groups ranging from the American Civil
Liberties Union to the Southern Poverty Law Center to Planned Parenthood to

82.
83.

84.

85.

blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/01/19/donald-trump-has-assembled-the-worst-cabinet-inamerican-history [https://perma.cc/S35X-BZAY].
See supra note 74.
Daniel Dale, Donald Trump Has Spent a Year Lying Shamelessly. It Hasn’t Worked,
TORONTO STAR (Dec. 22, 2017), http://www.thestar.com/news/world/analysis/2017/
12/22/donald-trump-has-spent-a-year-lying-shamelessly-it-hasnt-worked.html
[https://perma.cc/FHQ4-XWNU].
See, e.g., Matthew J. Belvedere & Michael Newberg, New York Times Subscription Growth
Soars Tenfold, Adding 132,000, After Trump’s Win, CNBC (Nov. 29, 2016, 10:32 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/29/new-york-times-subscriptions-soar-tenfold-afterdonald-trump-wins-presidency.html [https://perma.cc/3Q77-724G]; Jackie Flynn
Mogensen, 10 Great Things That Trump Has Given America in the Last Year, MOTHER
JONES (Nov. 8, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/11/ten-greatthings-that-trump-has-given-america-in-the-last-year [https://perma.cc/X2AV-W2MZ].
See Paul Farhi, Washington Post’s David Fahrenthold Wins Pulitzer Prize for Dogged
Reporting of Trump’s Philanthropy, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.washington
post.com/lifestyle/style/washington-posts-david-fahrenthold-wins-pulitzer-prize-fordogged-reporting-of-trumps-philanthropy/2017/04/10/dd535d2e-1dfb-11e7-be2a3a1fb24d4671_story.html [https://perma.cc/6S73-5EN5]. The 2018 Pulitzers continued in
this vein, awarding prizes for skeptical coverage of President Trump’s proposed border
wall and for coverage of Russian interference in the 2016 election and in the Trump
administration. See 2018 Pulitzer Prize Winners: Full List, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/16/business/media/pulitzer-prize-winners.html.
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the Environmental Defense Fund have likewise swelled during Trump’s
presidency.86
Government institutions have also pushed back against President Trump
in ways that respond directly and indirectly to his norm violations. Pointing at
times to Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric as well as various procedural
irregularities, federal courts have struck down, stayed, or forced significant
modifications to his administration’s immigration policies regarding travel
bans,87 sanctuary cities,88 and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
program,89 leading some to conclude that judges are part of a “legal resistance”
against Trump.90 Despite the fact that Republicans control both the House and
the Senate and are continually charged by Democrats with partisan
obsequiousness to the president, Congress has been an additional (if uneven)
site of resistance. This has taken forms ranging from new economic sanctions
on Russia passed by nearly unanimous majorities in both chambers as

86.
87.

88.
89.
90.

See According to Charity Navigator, First 100 Days of Trump Administration Changed a
Pattern in Charitable Donations, CHARITY NAVIGATOR (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.charity
navigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=4890 [https://perma.cc/A4N2-P56L].
The Supreme Court, by a 5–4 vote, ultimately upheld the third iteration of the
administration’s travel ban in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). However, lower
court decisions enjoining the ban not only had the effect of delaying its implementation,
but also resulted in a significant narrowing of the original version. See Steve Vladeck, The
Supreme Court’s Muslim Travel Ban Case Proves the Power of the Judiciary Branch in the
Age of Trump, NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018, 2:27 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
think/opinion/muslim-travel-ban-supreme-court-case-proves-power-judiciary-branchncna868736 [https://perma.cc/KV79-VERX] (noting, prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision, that “whether the justices ultimately side with the president or the challengers in
Trump v. Hawaii, the . . . federal courts . . . have been instrumental in pushing the executive
branch to more properly tailor what Trump calls the ‘travel ban’ in the first place”).
County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017); City of Chicago v.
Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017), aff’d 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018).
Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
This terminology has been used by conservative critics and liberal supporters alike. On the
conservative side, see, for example, Josh Blackman, On the Judicial Resistance, LAWFARE
(Feb. 12, 2018), http://lawfareblog.com/judicial-resistance [https://perma.cc/B73C3NWW]; Judging the Travel Ban—and Judges, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2018, at A12. On the
liberal side, see, for example, Eric Schneiderman, A Year of Legal Resistance, MEDIUM (Dec.
26, 2017), http://medium.com/@AGSchneiderman/over-100-official-acts-to-protect-newyorkers-from-washingtons-harmful-agenda-cf046c5dbd07 [https://perma.cc/H8AP-R3GG];
Jeff Turrentine, This Leader of the (Legal) Resistance Has Never Felt More Ready, NRDC
(Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.nrdc.org/stories/leader-legal-resistance-never-felt-more-ready
[https://perma.cc/8TED-QMXV].
Others on the left, however, urge that this
characterization of the judiciary be rejected. See Dahlia Lithwick & Steve Vladeck,
Resisting the Myth of the Judicial Resistance, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2018, 4:44 PM),
http://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/the-judges-whove-ruled-against-trumparent-part-of-some-judicial-resistance.html [https://perma.cc/3TNQ-6DT5].
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punishment for Russia’s pro-Trump electoral meddling,91 to resolutions that
convey disagreement with the president’s foreign policy provocations,92 to
oversight hearings that have damaged his public standing,93 to refusals to confirm
some of his preferred personnel.94 Nor is the governmental resistance limited
to federal institutions. For instance, state officials have brought some of the
leading lawsuits against the administration; several state legislatures are
considering more aggressive measures, such as requiring presidential
candidates to disclose their tax returns as a condition of ballot access;95 and at

91.
92.

93.
94.

95.

Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44, 131 Stat.
886 (2017).
E.g., H.R. Res. 256, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted) (expressing support for the NATO
alliance in the face of Trump’s attacks); H.R. Res. 397, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted)
(same); S. Res. 584, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted) (expressing opposition to allowing
Russia to question former U.S. diplomatic and military personnel, a proposal to which
Trump had signaled openness). On the importance of such resolutions, see generally
Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons From Congressional Practice, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 573 (2008).
See Josh Chafetz, The Real ‘Resistance’ to Trump? The GOP Congress., POLITICO (June 6,
2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/06/the-real-resistance-to-trumpthe-gop-congress-215230 [https://perma.cc/7KF3-3G3R].
See, e.g., Aaron Blake, 4 Trump Nominees Have Gone Down in One Week, and He’s Got
GOP Senators to Blame, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2017), http://www.washington
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/12/19/four-trump-nominees-have-gone-down-in-oneweek-and-hes-got-gop-senators-to-blame
[https://perma.cc/4BF3-VBLP];
Karoun
Demirjian, White House Withdraws Judicial Nominee Ryan Bounds, After GOP Realizes He
Didn’t Have Votes for Confirmation, WASH. POST (July 19, 2018), http://www.washington
post.com/powerpost/senate-gop-withdraws-judicial-nominee-ryan-bounds-delivering-ablow-to-trumps-court-plans/2018/07/19/0d81ff50-8b83-11e8-8aea-86e88ae760d8_story.html
[https://perma.cc/USP3-LQHZ]; Alan Rappeport, Labor Choice Drops Out After
Republicans Balk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2017, at A1. See generally Anne Joseph O’Connell,
After One Year in Office, Trump’s Behind on Staffing but Making Steady Progress,
BROOKINGS (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.brookings.edu/research/after-one-year-in-officetrumps-behind-on-staffing-but-making-steady-progress [https://perma.cc/MZ69-VHCM]
(“In the first year, President Trump had a higher [nominee] failure rate . . . than all but one
of his predecessors [going back through the George H.W. Bush administration].”).
The California State Legislature actually passed such a bill, only to have it vetoed by
Democratic Governor Jerry Brown over constitutional concerns. See John Myers, Trump
Won’t Have to Disclose Tax Returns to Get on California’s Ballot, as Gov. Jerry Brown
Vetoes Bill, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2017, 11:54 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/
essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-trump-tax-returns-veto-jerry-brown1508092026-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/7PEU-SCAZ]. On the debate over the
constitutionality of such laws, see, for example, Richard L. Hasen, How States Could Force
Trump to Release His Tax Returns, POLITICO (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2017/03/donald-trump-tax-returns-release-214950
[https://perma.cc/
5JNZ-YSRC]; Derek T. Muller, Don’t Use the Ballot to Get Trump’s Tax Returns, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/opinion/dont-use-the-ballotto-get-trumps-tax-returns.html.
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least one state is conducting its own investigation into Trump’s business
dealings.96
Voters, too, have gotten in on the act. If some of President Trump’s
supporters thrill to his norm transgressions, elections since November 2016,
both special and regular, have demonstrated widespread discontent with
Trump and his party.97 Relatedly, Republican members of Congress (including
the Speaker of the House) are retiring in droves,98 while Democrats are
experiencing a banner recruiting season,99 spurred in part by new groups like
Run for Something.100
Largely as a consequence of these interrelated developments, Trump is by
many measures “a weak president,” if not “on the brink of a failed

See Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, New York Attorney General Seeks Power to
Bypass Presidential Pardons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/
04/18/nyregion/schneiderman-trump-mueller-pardons.html; Colby Hamilton, After
Shake-up, NY AG’s Office Remains Backstop for Trump-Related Probes, N.Y.L.J. (May 24,
2018), http://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/05/24/after-shake-up-ny-ags-officeremains-backstop-for-trump-related-probes [https://perma.cc/Y6AH-NDY2].
97. On special elections, see Philip Bump, This Is What the Democratic Special Election Wave
Looks Like, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
politics/wp/2018/01/17/this-is-what-the-democratic-special-election-wave-looks-like
[https://perma.cc/6JKX-KT5U]; Harry Enten, Special Elections So Far Point to a
Democratic Wave in 2018, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 13, 2017), http://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/special-elections-so-far-point-to-a-democratic-wave-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/
Z8AD-XZU3]; G. Elliott Morris, What Happened in Pennsylvania’s 18th and What It
Means for Democrats in November, CROSSTAB (Mar. 16, 2018), http://www.the
crosstab.com/2018/03/16/pa-18 [https://perma.cc/6XEV-SNG2]; Matthew Yglesias,
Democrats Flipped a Missouri State Legislature Seat That Trump Won by 28 Points, VOX
(Feb. 7, 2018, 10:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/ 2018/2/7/16984836/
missouri-special-election-results [https://perma.cc/4BSB-V3JM]. On regular elections, see
Eric Bradner, Democrats Sweep in Virginia, New Jersey, CNN (Nov. 8, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/07/politics/2017-us-election-highlights/index.html
[https://perma.cc/44VY-8LPS].
98. See Russell Berman, The 2018 Congressional Retirement Tracker, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2018),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/the-2018-congressional-retirementtracker/545723 [https://perma.cc/UUL6-8KYL]; Michael Tackett, Republican Retirements
Raise Talk of Democratic Wave in November, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/us/politics/republicans-retirements-house-democratswave-2018.html.
99. See Seth Masket, The Sheer Number of Democrats Running for Congress Is a Good Sign for
the Party, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 17, 2017, 5:51 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/the-sheer-number-of-democrats-running-for-congress-is-a-good-sign-for-theparty [https://perma.cc/G5HC-RSKE].
100. See Edward-Isaac Dovere, ‘Run for Something’ Backs Dozens of Progressive Candidates,
POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2017, 1:01 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/17/run-forsomething-backs-dozens-of-progressive-candidates-243867 [https://perma.cc/VM2J-8WZH];
RUN FOR SOMETHING, http://runforsomething.net [https://perma.cc/YW3H-AQAL].
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presidency.”101 Given their control of all three branches of the federal
government, Republicans have accomplished remarkably little thus far in
Trump’s tenure, and those accomplishments they can point to—judicial
appointments and tax cuts, primarily102—are the sorts of things any Republican
leaders would have done. In short, the perception that President Trump is an
extraordinary norm flouter has helped fuel an extraordinary pushback, which
has had significant success.103
It is, of course, too early to tell how the remainder of Trump’s presidency
will play out. If Trump is reelected, certain constitutional norms might well be
upended in the process, although this would depend on a close reading of how
he actually behaves in his second term and what effects that behavior has. At
this writing, however, the evidence surveyed in this Part suggests that many
of the constitutional norms Trump has tried to destroy may emerge not just
intact but stronger for it.
By contrast, some of the norm decomposition transpiring in Congress and
in state legislatures has generated less public pushback and—partly for that very
reason—likely poses the more serious threat to our constitutional future. As we
argued in Parts II and III, the line between norm adherence and norm
decomposition is irreducibly a matter of interpretation, and every norm is
subject to walking that line. But even still, there is a case to be made that various
constitutional norms are in the process of unraveling in especially worrisome
ways that have little to do with President Trump. Or rather, the decomposition
of these norms predates and to some extent helps explain Trump’s political
ascent; he is more symptom than cause of the democratic decay it reflects.104

101. Matthew Glassman, Donald Trump Is a Dangerously Weak President, VOX (Dec. 27, 2017),
http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/12/4/16733450/donald-trump-weak-presidentneustadt [https://perma.cc/W36Z-XL9X]; see also Corey Robin, If Authoritarianism Is
Looming in the US, How Come Donald Trump Looks So Weak?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2018),
http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/commentisfree/2018/ jan/13/ american-democracyperil- trump-power [https://perma.cc/J79J-RFG2].
102. See, e.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); Fishkin
& Pozen, supra note 9, at 982 n.266 (“Perhaps the most unifying action [President Trump]
has taken to date—the action that most appeals to the disparate strands of the Republican
coalition—is . . . pushing through ideologically conservative judicial nominees, in
particular Justice Gorsuch, under the banner of constitutional restorationism.”).
103. See Max Boot, America Is Resisting Trump’s Onslaught. Just Don’t Get Cocky., WASH. POST
(Feb. 7, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/america-isresisting-trumps-onslaught-just-dont-get-cocky/2018/02/07/d75f5c5a-0c21-11e8-8890372e2047c935_story.html [https://perma.cc/JU4T-4UKQ].
104. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot, in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN
AMERICA 19, 27 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018) (describing the Trump presidency as “a
symptom of constitutional rot and constitutional dysfunction”).
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We do not have the space here to go into any detail, but among many
possible candidates, we would highlight the decomposition over the past two or
so decades of: (1) norms that foster respect for governmental expertise, whether
in the context of OLC,105 the Congressional Budget Office,106 the Senate
Parliamentarian,107 or elsewhere;108 (2) norms that proscribe certain forms of
high-stakes brinksmanship, including debt-ceiling default;109 (3) norms that
constrain the influence of lobbyists and donors on elected officials;110 and (4)
norms that constrain legislative efforts to shape the electorate for partisan
advantage.111 Each of these categories of norms is vital to sustaining fair and

105. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Bruce Ackerman, Lost Inside the
Beltway: A Reply to Professor Morrison, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 13 (2011) (decrying the
“politicization” of OLC and the rise of the White House Counsel as an alternative source of
interpretive guidance).
106. See, e.g., Michael R. Strain, Stop Bashing the CBO, Republicans, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2017,
4:30 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-08-01/stop-bashing-the-cborepublicans [https://perma.cc/Z56U-4L8U] (critiquing recent Republican efforts to
discredit and defund the office).
107. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 9, at 931, 939 n.99 (discussing Senate Republicans’ dismissal in
2001 of their own hand-picked parliamentarian in response to a disfavored ruling).
108. See, e.g., id. at 930 (noting Newt Gingrich’s maneuvers as Speaker of the House in the late
1990s “to consolidate power in the Speaker’s office and ‘dismantle’ congressional
institutions with professional staff” (quoting Bruce Bartlett, Gingrich and the Destruction
of Congressional Expertise, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Nov. 29, 2011), http://economix.
blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/gingrich-and-the-destruction-of-congressional-expertise
[https://perma.cc/MS6N-MZHV])); Kevin R. Kosar, The Struggle Between Objectivity vs.
Neutrality Continues at the Congressional Research Service, LEGBRANCH (Feb. 13, 2018),
http://www.legbranch.com/theblog/2018/2/11/the-struggle-between-objectivity-vsneutrality-continues-at-the-congressional-research-service [https://perma.cc/CPQ5-VQYN]
(describing partisan threats since the 1990s to a range of legislative support agencies that
“were established to add knowledge to the political process”).
109. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 9, at 932–33, 947 n.123, 961 & n.184 (discussing debtceiling brinksmanship in recent Congresses).
110. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT 99–107 (2011) (arguing that increasing pressure to raise money has
coincided with “radically different congressional norms” on fundraising and lobbying over
the past several decades); David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 265, 266–68 (2008) (describing the growing role of campaign expenditures in state
court races and observing that, “[w]ith remarkable speed, the distinctive rules, norms, and
politics of judicial elections have begun to disappear”).
111. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 9, at 931 n.61 (“The post-2000 wave of Republicansponsored measures aiming to restrict voting in one way or another came as a surprise to
voting rights scholars, who had generally assumed that ‘vote denial’ controversies were a
thing of the past.”). On the other side of the aisle, Republican officials have characterized
certain Democratic governors’ attempts to circumvent felon disenfranchisement laws as
norm decomposing. See, e.g., Graham Moomaw, McAuliffe Restores Voting Rights for
206K Ex-Felons; GOP Calls It Move to Boost Clinton, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 22,
2016), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/mcauliffe-restoresvoting-rights-for-k-ex-felons-gop-calls/article_771db279-34d6-5a3d-9557-
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effective constitutional governance. Within each category, however, a complex
chain of behaviors has arguably already drained pertinent norms of much of
their regulative force. And with some partial exceptions in areas such as
gerrymandering, this has happened largely without triggering bipartisan
condemnation, robust countermeasures, or sustained public debate.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought, primarily, to illuminate the structure of
constitutional norm breakdown. We have tried to show that distinguishing
norm destruction from norm decomposition and appreciating the multiple
axes of norm instability can go a long way toward clarifying how unwritten
rules and conventions do and do not change over time. Building on this
conceptual framework, we have further argued that when one believes some
existing constitutional norm to be desirable, in many cases—indeed in most
cases—one ought to be more concerned about its being incrementally revised
than about its being openly flouted. And this, in turn, suggests a somewhat
surprising lesson: President Trump’s most significant legacy for the evolution
of constitutional norms may not be that he laid waste to so many of them, but
rather that he obscured where the real normative decay was occurring. Insofar
as there is an economy of outrage in American politics and civil society, that
economy strikes us as overly fixated on President Trump himself.
If we are right about this, it would seem to counsel not only new forms of
political mobilization but also a new focus for public law scholarship. While
perceived attempts to destroy constitutional norms will continue to demand
(and, by their very nature, receive) critical attention, our analysis implies that
constitutional scholars could bring their distinctive expertise to bear by
identifying and explicating ongoing constitutional norm decompositions—a
task that often requires significant historical perspective and institutional
acumen.112 Given the inherent instability of such norms, scholars could add
still more value by offering explicit normative critiques or defenses of particular
formulations of the practices in question. Dealing effectively with norm change

a417a8afb212.html [https://perma.cc/DPN5-CC2R]. The fact that many committed
citizens—ourselves included—find felon disfranchisement laws to be morally and
democratically repugnant only proves our point in Part III about the limits of contentindependent analyses of norm breakdowns.
112. For an important recent study in this mold, see generally Renan, supra note 18
(documenting decomposition of the norm of “OLC supremacy”).
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requires, for academics and activists alike, changing some of the ways we think
and talk about norms.

